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Executive share ownership, experience and basic salaries: 
the influence on IPO share option schemes and performance 
 
ABSTRACT 
Corporate governance research often focuses on two theoretical stands, agency theory and 
resource dependence theory.  Whist both provide distinct theoretical roles, this paper 
combines them to argue that executive stock option plans (ESOs) can serve a dual role, that 
of re-alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests, and board stability, by ‘locking’ the 
executive to reward and thus retaining managerial talent.  The paper focuses on a unique 
sample of 311 entrepreneurial initial public offerings.  It examines their choice of schemes 
prior to and at the initial public offering (IPO).  It gives consideration to ESO choices being 
associated with board ownership, executive wealth and cognitive characteristics of the IPO 
firm’s management team.  Finally, it examines performance in line with signalling theory, 
showing that IPO underpricing is reduced by the presence of executive stock options and 
that high growth positively moderates the link between underpricing and conditional ESO 
plans. 
 
Key words: Corporate governance, Initial public offering, executive stock options, 
underpricing, signalling 
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Executive share ownership, experience and basic salaries: 
the influence on IPO share option schemes and performance 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Agency theory underpins much of the research on corporate governance.  Studies have 
looked at board composition and characteristics (Arthur, 2001; Daily & Dalton, 1994; 
Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 
2000). 
 
As such the structure of our paper is as follows.  Firstly we look at agency theory and how it 
underpins much of the research in the corporate governance stream and how it describes the 
separation of ownership from control and its remedies to improve firm performance.  
Secondly, we examine the board of directors as a provision of company resources in light of 
the resource-based view of the firm.  We then proceed to examine factors that can influence 
the use and choice of incentive pay schemes, to both motive performance and retain/recruit 
executive talent.  Finally, we discuss important questions as to the strategic use of such 
schemes particularly in line with corporate governance and whether such schemes enhance 
performance, signal quality of governance or are simply a way to give additional pay to the 
executive directors.  
 
Agency Theory 
Agency theory underpins much of the research into corporate governance as it focuses on 
the separation of ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  The separation of 
ownership and control creates the situation where one party (the owners) then has to 
delegate work to a manager (the agent).  In particular, the classic agency problem is 
characterised by asymmetries of information, with the balance of power lying with the agent 
who may turn to opportunistic behaviour (Holmstrom, 1979).  Theory then attempts to explain 
this agency relationship in terms of contracts that explain the rights of each party (Hart, 
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1995).  Agency theory then encourages the implementation of policies and procedures to 
monitor the behaviour of the agent.  One such way to aid this is to use incentives that 
specifically take steps to realign the interests of the agent with those of the principals (Fama, 
1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
 
This is particularly pertinent at the point of the IPO as the company exposes itself to public 
investment through the open market.  It purports that the board of directors should be 
encouraged to act in the shareholders best interests with the use of outcome based contracts 
which re-align the preferences of both the principal and the agent.   One such accepted way 
of providing an outcome based contract is to incorporate the use of executive stock option 
schemes in the remuneration of the board of directors (Fama, 1980; Fama et al., 1983).  
These rely on the ability to reward the agent for acting in the interests of the owners by giving 
them ownership opportunities (Jensen & Murphy, 1990).  Indeed best practice recommend 
that they are directly linked to performance outcomes (Association of British Insurers, 2004; 
Financial Reporting Council, 2006). 
 
If corporate governance is defined as the structures, processes, cultures and systems that 
engender the successful operation of an organisation (Keasey, Thompson, & Wright, 1997) 
then stock option schemes could be considered as a corporate governance tool.  As such 
schemes can be examined in their own right and this examination would extend the growth in 
governance research and reinforce the agency theory perspective.   
 
Resource Dependency Theory 
Resource dependency theory was developed to explain how organisations and/or individuals 
use power to obtain the resources needed for the firm to function.  Utilising the resource 
dependence perspective, the board of directors can be seen to be a pool of resources for the 
company (Daily et al., 1994; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Since individuals in critical positions 
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(particularly the top executives) control the resources, they are also able to exert influence 
over the determination of pay levels (Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1987).   
 
Signalling 
Signalling theory is based around the premise that information asymmetries exist between 
insiders of a firm and external bodies.  This premise holds particularly true in the IPO context, 
when companies can be deemed to have better knowledge of the present value of the firm 
and future potential and cash flow than can investors.  With particular reference to this, 
signalling within the IPO context has focussed on levels of underpricing (Beatty & Ritter, 
1986; Certo, Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 2001a; Filatotchev et al., 2002; Pham, Kalev, & Steen, 
2003).  In going public, firms are deemed to transfer ownership and control to new 
shareholders.   
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Bringing any company to the public market for the first time involves many standardised 
processes whether in the US or UK (Ellis, Michaely, & O'Hara, 1988; London Stock 
Exchange, 2002).  However, it is not just the processes for flotation that must be undertaken; 
when it comes to gaining investors it is important to show that corporate governance has 
been taken seriously and systems are in place to protect the shareholders investment.  
Whilst other studies have shown that board composition has been crucial for success and 
performance (Certo, 2003; Certo et al., 2001a; Filatotchev et al., 2002; Mak & Roush, 2000) 
and retained ownership may enhance firms’ values (McBain & Krause, 1989; Mikkelson, 
Partch, & Shah, 1997), this study enhances previous research by taking a cross discipline 
approach.  It investigates executive pay and pay systems at the point of the IPO and 
speculates as to what this might communicate to investors through the offering document 
and how this may relate to underpricing.   
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The flotation of a firm sees the development of the classic agency problem: the divorce of 
ownership and control (Jensen et al., 1976).  As such, the IPO firm provides a unique 
environment to examine any agency problem.  Agency theory sees the development of pay 
structures that provide incentives based compensation schemes that gives the ability to 
reward the agents for acting in the best interests of the owners (Fama, 1980; Fama et al., 
1983; Jensen et al., 1990).  Indeed this has been the foundation of much research into 
executive pay within the mature company (Buck, Bruce, Main, & Udueni, 2003; Conyon, 
Peck, & Sadler, 2000; Jensen et al., 1990; Murphy, 1985).  However, mature company 
research has had its focus on the relationship between pay and performance, rather than 
taking a more strategic overview of executive pay as a governance tool.  Asfer (2006) shows 
a strong negative relationship between the level of managerial ownership and corporate 
governance factors thus demonstrating the substitutability of ownership and governance 
mechanisms.  Executive pay, as determined by the Combined Code, could be considered as 
a strategic governance tool.   
 
The standard UK executive stock option scheme provides the executive with the right (but 
not the obligation) to purchase shares at a fixed predetermined price (the ‘exercise’ or ‘strike’ 
price) following some specified period time (usually after a minimum period of three years).  
With direct comparisons difficult, incentive schemes have been categorised as present or not 
present, and where present, those that have no specific performance targets attached, 
referred to subsequently as ‘unconditional’ schemes, and those with specific pre-determined 
performance target requirements in order for the share options to vest (‘conditional’ 
schemes) (Allcock & Pass, 2006).    
 
In the case of unconditional schemes there are no pre-determined performance requirements 
built in.  The executive ‘gains’ if the market price of the company’s shares at the time of 
vesting is greater than the ‘exercise’ price.  However, it is recommended that most modern 
option schemes are ‘conditional’ (Financial Reporting Council, 2006) and have pre-
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determined performance criteria attached thus preventing the executive from exercising their 
right to purchase until such performance criteria are met.  Thus schemes developed in this 
way fulfil an undelaying premise that they are an effective and suitable way to bridge agency 
problems (Fama, 1980; Fama et al., 1983).  This substitutability could also play a part in the 
IPO company.  This is further supported by Alchian & Demsetz (1972) who support that the 
concentration of ownership may be an effective approach to controlling the agency problems 
caused by the separation of risk-bearing and decision functions in firms (Demsetz, 1983; 
Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003)  
 
Considering the basic dilution of ownership argument presented by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and the above, it would seem reasonable to suggest that: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Executives’ ownership is negatively associated with the presence of equity 
based incentive schemes prior to the IPO 
Hypothesis 1b: Executives ownership is negatively associated with the presence of 
conditional schemes prior to the IPO.  
 
Brennan and Franks (1997) argue that in reality managers will want to retain ownership to 
prevent the control of the company going outside the firm, in spite of the transfer of 
ownership at the time of the IPO.  There is a further school of thought that greater levels of 
retained ownership leads to better post IPO performance over a longer time period (Jain & 
Kini, 1994).  However, Mikkelson et al (1997) argue it is not to the managerial equity post 
IPO that enhances performance but rather a smaller level of dilution at the time of the IPO.  
This is also re-enforced by south Asian-Pacific models as found by Cai and Wei (1997). 
 
Building upon this, it would also seem reasonable that the levels of retained ownership at the 
time of the IPO could provide an adequate substitute for schemes being tied to any stringent 
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performance targets that can be deemed to link rewards to increases in shareholder value.   
As such: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Executives’ ownership is negatively associated with the presence of 
conditional equity based incentive schemes in the IPO firm. 
 
Over the last decade there has been an increase in the use of variable pay packages for top 
executives (IRS Employment Review, 2000).  This might be due to the recommendations of 
good practice in corporate governance or simple globalisation of pay strategies with the UK 
moving towards a more US-style’ of executive rewards systems.  More recently though, 
Deloitte & Touche (2005b) have reported a slowdown in the levels of pay that come from 
such schemes.   PricewaterhouseCoopers, (2005)  found that the value of long-term 
incentive grants increased by 10 percent on average in FTSE-100 companies in 2004, with 
the biggest increases arising in the largest companies. This however, represents a slower 
rate of increase compared with recent years which parallels the report by Deloittes & Touche.  
On average incentives comprised of 51 percent of FTSE 100 lead executives total earnings 
in year June 2004-2005 (IDS, 2005), this still represents a substantial amount of money. 
 
It is not just the levels of bonuses and incentives that have been examined by consultancy 
companies but also basic salaries.  Directors’ remuneration levels in the FTSE 100 were not 
only boosted by high levels of incentives, but high increases in salaries and total cash 
(defined as base salary and bonus), with an average increase of 8.3 percent (IDS, 2005).  
Deloitte & Touche (2005a) warn newly floated firms that they should ensure base salaries 
are set at an appropriate level in order not to be out of line with the market.  They also 
highlight that executive reward is an essential tool for recruiting further talent to the board, 
which might be particularly relevant for companies undertaking an IPO.  However, if basic 
salaries are set too high, then the impact of performance based rewards might be reduced, 
similarly too low and the addition reward might be heavily relied upon.  As such levels of 
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salary might impact on whether incentive schemes have performance conditions attached 
down to the likelihood of returns from them, thus: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Executives’ salary is negatively (positively) associated with the presence of 
unconditional (conditional) ESO scheme in the IPO firm.  
 
The board of directors facilitate the decision making process and provide  a pool of resources 
for the firm (Daily & Dalton, 1992).  Organisational theorists and strategy research has 
already established a relationship between the skills of top executive teams and 
organisational outcomes (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001b).  As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the human capital theory of pay dictates that individual characteristic 
of the executives can be predictors of levels of executive pay for the top management team 
(Gerhart & Mulkovich, 1990).  Entwined with this is the proposition that the literature further 
suggests that the top management team is critical to strategic direction, growth and firm 
performance (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  For example, it was found that entrepreneurs with 
prior new venture experience influenced their firms to make faster decisions (Forbes, 2001).  
This has been further linked to a firm’s legitimacy and reputation (Daily & Schwenk, 1996; 
Zajac, 1988; Zajac & Westphal, 1996).   
 
Within the investment world venture capitalists place the highest priority in the venture 
screening process on the quality of the top management team (Keeley & Roure, 1990; 
Muzyka, Birley, Leleux, & Bendixen, 1993).   Indeed firms with more prestigious and 
experienced boards of directors at the IPO show better performance (by less underpricing)  
(Certo et al., 2001b).  This is supported by Cohen  and Dean (2001) who found that top 
management teams positively impact on the strategic value of new ventures.   
 
From a resource based perspective, this is vitally important as the skills of the executive 
directors are seen to support the whole organisation (Pfeffer et al., 1978) and their 
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experience helps enhance the reputation of the company (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  Thus 
more prestigious executives have considerable human capital at stake with their reputation 
and as such are less likely to significantly under-perform.  This would be acknowledged 
within the terms and conditions of employed executives at both a pay level and performance 
level.  As such the strength of their reputation (and the thought of losing it) could provide a 
simple substitute for any incentive pay strategy.  Hence,  
 
Hypothesis 4: Executives’ reputation is negatively (positively) associated with the presence 
of conditional (unconditional) ESO scheme in the IPO firm  
 
Most of the existing research on underpricing focuses on the apparent information 
asymmetries that exists between the IPO firm and outside investors (Certo et al., 2001a; 
Espenlaub & Tonks, 1998).   This has been developed from the original work of Rock (1986).  
Rock assumes that various parties to the IPO are ‘uninformed’ about the true values of the 
shares whilst others are ‘informed’.  As such information the information asymmetry that 
exists can lead uniformed investors to subscribe to what may be considered less successful 
IPOs.  There is then the potential for these uniformed investors to withdraw from the market 
altogether, keeping them in the market is often seen as one rational as to why underpricing 
occurs. 
 
Another stand of thought within the underpricing literature is that the initial owners of the 
company underprice the IPO in order to signal favorable information about the value of the 
firm to investors (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; Daily, Certo, Dalton, & Roengpitya, 2003; 
Espenlaub et al., 1998; Michaely & Shaw, 1994).   Governance factors can then be 
considered as a signal of a well managed company that has future potential for investors’ 
returns.   According to some signaling research, retained ownership by the executives can 
lead to higher firm value (McBain et al., 1989).  Executives of high quality firms, by retaining 
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higher ownership levels, communicate favorable information to investors and confidence in 
future returns (Beatty et al., 1994; Filatotchev et al., 2002; Mikkelson et al., 1997).   
 
Another governance factor that can indicate quality of the firm is the number of non-executive 
independent directors present on the board and the level of board independence that this 
brings.  A strong, independent board shows accountability (Higgs, 2003; Roberts, McNulty, & 
Stiles, 2005), which will signal good practice to the potentially uniformed investor. 
 
Similarly, the choice of underwriter bringing the firm to the market had also been seen to 
affect the issue price and subsequently underpricing.  Experienced or ‘prestigious’ 
underwriters certify the IPO value to the uninformed investor (Loughran & Ritter, 2004). All of 
these factors have been linked to underpricing, yet within the agency theory paradigm, the 
use of incentive pay to realign the board executives with the shareholders can also be seen 
as good corporate governance.  We therefore argue that this too could be considered a 
positive signal to future investors, hence: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Underpricing is negatively associated with the presence of conditional 
executive stock option schemes prior to the time of the IPO.  
METHODS 
Sample and Data 
The data sample used in this analysis comprises of a unique data set of 311 initial public 
offering companies that have founders on the boards of directors at the time of flotation.  
Between the period of 1 January 1998 and 31 December 2002, a total of 766 companies 
were floated as initial public offerings on the London Stock Exchange (Main market and the 
TechMark) and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) that were UK incorporated.  For the 
sample selections the prospectuses for all 766 companies were obtained.  These were 
predominately obtained from Thomson Research, which provides a comprehensive coverage 
of company filings for publicly quoted UK companies.  Missing prospectuses were obtained 
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either via company web sites, or by telephone/written request to the companies or their 
advisors whichever was deemed more appropriate.   
 
The prospectus provides a wealth of information including details of the company’s financial 
history, background details to the board of directors, remuneration contract detail with levels 
of basic salaries, share ownership and details of any equity based incentive schemes. Each 
prospectus was examined and particular emphasis given to the section detailing the history 
and founders of the company.  Any companies that were unit or investment trust were 
excluded from the sample first, (these have particular governance characteristics) then those 
deemed to involve a de-merger, merger or acquisition, corporate spin off, equity carve outs, 
reorganisations, or could be considered as solely acquisition vehicles were also excluded 
(Filatotchev et al., 2002).  This resulted in 311 companies who clearly demonstrated that they 
had been developed via the entrepreneurial process with entrepreneurial founders and those 
founders were serving as directors at the time of the company’s flotation.   
 
Variables 
Within the UK, the application for listing (prospectus) is a legal document.  Any director of a 
newly listed company must accept legal responsibility for the information supplied in the 
prospectus during the flotation process (London Stock Exchange, 2002).  Thus the 
authenticity of any information taken directly from the IPO prospectus is assured.  It is this 
document that has been the root source for most of our data collection. 
 
Dependent Variables 
Stock option schemes are diverse by their very nature.  It is almost impossible to categorise 
one scheme as being ‘more effective’ than another.  For this reason, simple dichotomous 
indicator variables provided the best means of coding for this analysis.   The presence of a 
stock option scheme prior to the IPO was coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. Similarly, whether the 
scheme had specific performance targets attached at the time of the IPO in order for the 
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options to vest to the directors was also coded as 1 (conditional scheme) else 0 
(unconditional scheme where grants vest ‘unconditionally’ to the executive following the 
specified period of time only.)  
 
For the OLS regressions, we used the IPO’s underpricing as the dependant variable and a 
measure of short term performance.  We defined underpricing as the percentage difference 
in the offer price and the price at the end of the first day of trading (Barry, Muscarella, 
Peavey, & Vetsupens, 1990).   
 
Independent Variables 
Ownership for the purposes of the analysis was split into the pre and at IPO positions as 
shown in the prospectus.  Ownership details were initially collected against each individual 
director with dummy variables created to indicate board position.  Particular attention had to 
be given where shares were attributed as being part of trusts or held by seemingly outside 
firms that were controlled by a particular director.  As a result of this, where the specific 
voting rights were controlled held by the individual director, these were included in their share 
ownership. A cumulative total was used for all executive directors’ ownership and for non-
executive directors’ ownership. 
 
We defined executive’s experience as the total outside management positions and board 
memberships currently held and previously held over the last five years, as disclosed in the 
prospectus.  In line with previous research, board independence was taken to be the ratio of 
non- executive independent directors to executive independent directors.  Executive 
compensation was taken to be the basic salary (i.e. the guaranteed amount) paid to the 
executives’.  This measure was deemed to fairly represent the risk free remunerative return 
to the executive.  Due to research in mature companies stating that size has an implication 
on salary (Conyon, Gregg, & Machin, 1995; Conyon et al., 2000; Murphy, 1985; Murphy, 
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2003), we adjusted for company size by dividing by the sales figure in the year prior to the 
IPO. 
 
Control Variables 
In order to prevent any unauthentic correlations in the binary logit and multiple regression 
analysis, several control variables were used.  Previous research indicates that size and age 
of the company can have effects on organisational structures (Mikkelson et al., 1997).  In 
recognition of this, we used the logarithm of the market capitalization at the offer price as one 
representation of size and the logarithm of sales in the year leading up to the IPO as another.  
The age of the firm has been used to control for the sophistication of the firm as its 
organisational structure and the development of governance strategies may be linked to life-
cycle development effects (Core, Holthausen, & Larker, 1999; Hall & Leibman, 1998; 
Mikkelson et al., 1997).  The age of the firm was calculated in years from the point of 
founding to the point of the IPO.  SIC codes were examined to identify ‘high-tech’ companies.  
A dummy variable was created, coded 1 for a high tech company, otherwise 0. 
 
The sample covers a five year period with a stock market peak mid way through.  Boom 
periods by their nature encourage a large number of new issues and offer high stock returns. 
To account for such fluctuations two variables were created.  The market return variable was 
calculated as a weighted average of the buy-and-hold returns of the AIM index in the three 
months prior to the IPO date.  The weights were equal to 3 for the first month, 2 for the 
second month and 1 for the third month prior to the offering, and the weighed sum was 
divided by 6.  The market volatility was calculated as the standard deviation of the one-month 
returns of the AIM index in the immediate month prior to the IPO first-trade date.  AIM was 
deemed to be the most appropriate indicator as over 70% of the companies in the sample 
chose this market to float on. 
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As previous IPO research suggests underwriter quality may affect the IPO firm’s 
performance.  The UK does not demonstrate the same underwriter system as the US enable 
rankings identical to Loughran & Ritter (2004).  To be comparable to this, all underwriters 
were noted over the sample period of time along with their cumulative market share.   A 
dummy variable was created using 1 to indicate the top 5 underwriters over the period, else 
0.  Similarly, the involvement of venture capitalists can have an effect on the governance of 
firms (Barry et al., 1990).  Venture capitalist backing was a dummy variable coded 1 if the 
company had VC backing and 0 otherwise.  Venture capital firms were identified from the 
British Venture Capital Association’s Directories covering the sample period. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for all variables used.  These have been 
categorised into the companies who have stock option schemes prior to their IPO and those 
who do not.  Furthermore those with schemes, have been subdivided into firms who tie 
grants of options to specific performance criteria in order for them to vest to the executive 
(conditional schemes) and those whose schemes vest only after the required period of time 
(non conditional schemes). Of the 311 companies in the sample, 126 firms had stock option 
schemes prior to their IPO.  In terms of general firm and director characteristics, older firms, 
with lower levels of executive ownership are more likely to have schemes (consistent with 
agency theory predictions). Furthermore, these firms have less experienced board of 
directors who have higher levels of monitoring (board independence) and venture capitalist 
involvement.   
 
--------- Take in Table 1 near here --------- 
 
Initial investigations showed strong correlations between the levels of executive ownership 
and incentive schemes.  Indeed correlations significant at the 0.01% level were reported for 
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no schemes and unconditional incentive schemes, thus reinforcing agency theory.  
Furthermore, experience and basic salary also had correlations with stock option schemes.  
 
---------- Take in Table 2 near here ---------- 
 
The first stage of further examination was to examine the relationship between specific 
executive director characteristics and determine whether these had any significant effect on 
whether stock option schemes were used by the firm.  Table 3 shows the results of the 
binary logit analysis examining the ownership and experience of the executives, along with 
their levels of basic remuneration.  In all models, the levels of ownership by the executive 
directors was significant and in line with agency theory predictions. The greater levels of 
ownership reduce the need for the use of  stock option schemes, thus hypothesis 1a and 1b, 
ownership being negatively associated with the presence of ESO schemes pre the IPO, and 
conditional schemes pre the IPO is supported.  Model 4 shows no support for hypothesis 2, 
although the founder domination of the board is marginally significant here.   
 
 ---------- Take in Table 3 near here ---------- 
 
Model 5 shows that basic salary of the executives has a substitution effect on the incentive 
schemes and model 6 shows executives experience is also a significant factor driving the 
choice of such schemes, thus hypotheses 3 and 4 are supported.   
 
Pay schemes prior to and at the time of the IPO further signal governance aspects to future 
investor and reduce the levels of underpricing experienced at this time.  Thus table 4 shows 
strong support for hypotheses 5. 
 
---------- Take in Table 4 near here ---------- 
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 It appears that these not only signal future good governance but can add complementary 
effects to other governance aspects such as executive ownership and board independence.  
Thus table 4 shows strong support for hypotheses 5,   
 
 
DISCUSSION 
The main aim of this paper was to examine the factors influencing the presence of stock 
option schemes and to assess what type of roles such schemes might have at the point of 
the IPO.  The results of this study provide evidence that investors view the presence of stock 
option compensation positively.  We argue that any type of incentive scheme, whether linked 
to specific targets or not could indeed achieve board alignment with the shareholders and 
have an added retention effect to the executives who have been awarded grants.  Integrating 
the agency and resource perspective gives enhanced insight into the particular challenges 
faced by entrepreneurial firms at the point of their IPO.  If upholding the single view of 
agency theory, that the use of stock option schemes motive key managers to perform and 
align the financial interests of the executive with the shareholders, then the reality is that all 
stock option schemes should have performance targets attached in order to ensure that 
grants truly reflect increased shareholder return.  Our study shows us though that the vast 
majority of schemes (82%) in place prior to the IPO are non conditional, thus another tacit 
function might be emerging once or retaining executive talent on the board.  In an ever 
increasing global recruitment environment, this might prove to be particularly relevant.   
 
Stock options provide a rewarding way of retaining key players on the board for extended 
periods of time particularly through a time of company change and greater exposure to 
external influences.   
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LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research is not however without its limitations.  The sample’s focus is on the 
entrepreneurial IPO and this sample should be extended to provide a greater depth of 
investigation.   
Further extensions to this research could be suggested.  The dilution of ownership at the 
point of the IPO might just be the initial change, and that over time control would be lost by 
the board as shareholdings become more dispersed and involve different groups requiring 
different levels of monitoring and performance.  Boards will therefore progress and become 
more independent and with this might come changes either through greater monitoring or by 
gaining a pool of experienced independent directors who are more incentive pay aware.   
 
Research on long-term pay performance sensitivities could be undertaken with the growth of 
post IPO financial data.  This would give a beneficial comparator to the wealth of research 
undertaken with regards to executive pay and the mature listed company.  Furthermore, if 
undertaken following the initial three year cycle of stock option grants it would also provide 
enhanced perspectives to corporate governance life-cycle effects. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Pre IPO At IPO 
Variables With 
scheme 
Conditiona
l 
Un-
conditional 
Without 
scheme 
Conditional 
      
N 126 22 104 185 145 
Underpricing .0874 -.0097 .1084 .2132 .1180 
 (.3002) (.2989) (.2977) (.4011) (.2997) 
Executives’ Ownership Pre IPO 35.24 35.93 35.11 53.82 47.48 
 (25.12) (33.89) (23.25) (29.19) (28.94) 
Executives’ Ownership at IPO 26.14 31.34 25.01 36.63 32.59 
 (20.37) (27.05) (18.59) (22.81) (21.39) 
Executives’ Experience 19.55 8.50 21.11 20.38 19.16 
 (20.40) (7.18) (21.18) (15.91) (16.10) 
Mean Executives’ Compensation 169394 264882 148997 85497 155730 
 (215232) (383803) (153630) (65433) (203761) 
Founder domination  25.10 26.96 24.70 31.85 27.45 
 (12.47) (15.42) (11.80) (14.96) (13.84) 
Board Independence 44.04 44.39 43.97 40.37 41.65 
 (14.67) (18.14) (13.93) (14.21) (13.75) 
Sales -1 (in £000) 35934 58869 30732      8547 30481 
 (124396) (151308) (117748) (30204) (10595) 
Hi-Tech Company .34 .27 .36 .24 .30 
 (.476) (.456) (.481) (.430) (.461) 
Company Age  7.78 9.31 7.45 5.35 7.61 
 (6.80) (5.72) (6.99) (5.90) (6.94) 
Venture Capitalist backed 
dummy 
.40 .32 .42 .17 .31 
 (.492) (.477) (.496) (.374) (.465) 
Underwriter Reputation .33 .27 .35 .41 .36 
 (.473) (.456) (.478) (.492) (.481) 
Market Return -.0216 -.0180 -.0223 -.0078 -.0159 
 (.0648) (.0477) (.0680) (.0791) (.7449) 
Market Volatility .0105 .0071 .0112 .0092 .0101 
 (.0093) (.0072) (.0095) (.0077) (.0090) 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix for all variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Pre IPO presence of incentive 
scheme            1         
2 Pre IPO presence of any 
conditional scheme .334**     1        
3 Pre IPO presence of any 
unconditional scheme .859** -.196** 1       
4 Pre IPO no incentive scheme -1.000** -.334** -.859** 1      
5 At IPO: presence of any conditional 
scheme .066 .235** -.062 -.066 1     
6 Underpricing  -.168** -.130* -.104 .168** -.078 1    
7 Executives’ Ownership pre IPO -.314** -.095 -.276** .314** .045 .116 1   
8 Executives Ownership at IPO -.230** -.013 -.233** .230** .011 .071 .842** 1  
9 Executives Experience -.023 -.147* .043 .023 -.055 -.050 .099 .069 1 
10 Executive Compensation -.082 -.025 -.071 .082 .062 -.048 .037 -.069 -.042 
11 Founder domination -.231** -.041 -.218** .231** -.106 .100 .164** .149** .058 
12 Board Independence  .125* .048 .103 -.125* -.003 -.058 -.383** -.380** -.216** 
13 Sales -1 ( in £000) .154* .130* .083 -.154* .096 -.065 -.028 -.014 .044 
14 Hi tech company .107 -.006 .115* -.107 .040 .058 -.083 -.004 -.191** 
15 Company Age .187** .129* .124* -.187** .166** -.075 .105 .092 -.113 
16 Venture Capitalist Backed dummy .260** .036 .251** -.260** .089 .000 -.299** -.260** -.076 
17 Underwriter  reputation  -.073 -.059 -.044 .073 -.047 .032 .064 .054 -.017 
18 Market Return -.091 -.017 -.086 .091 .008 .340** .160** .112* -.104 
19 Market Volatility .074 -.086 .124* -.074 .047 .029 .028 .035 -.045 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 Pre IPO presence of incentive 
scheme         
2 Pre IPO presence of any 
conditional scheme         
3 Pre IPO presence of any 
unconditional scheme         
4 Pre IPO no incentive scheme         
5 At IPO: presence of any conditional 
scheme         
6 Underpricing          
7 Executives’ Ownership pre IPO         
8 Executives Ownership at IPO         
9 Executives Experience         
10 Executive Compensation 1          
11 Founder domination .169** 1         
12 Board Independence  -.004 -.227** 1        
13 Sales -1 ( in £000) -.064 -.187** .002 1       
14 Hi tech company .038 .006 .049 -.037 1      
15 Company Age -.065 -.224** -.005 .401** .015 1     
16 Venture Capitalist Backed dummy -.048 -.042 .164** .079 .098 .139* 1    
17 Underwriter  reputation  -.060 .049 -.133* -.036 -.002 -.041 -.096 1   
18 Market Return .024 .002 -.062 .039 -.057 .098 .036 .010 1  
19 Market Volatility .095 -.032 .023 -.126* .197** -.144* -.039 .004 -.063 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
  
Table 3: Regression analysis of the effects of ownership, experience and compensation on 
choice of stock option scheme 
Dependent Variable 
Incentive 
Scheme 
Pre IPO 
Incentive 
Scheme 
Pre IPO 
Conditional 
Incentive 
Scheme pre 
IPO 
Conditional 
Incentive 
Scheme at 
IPO 
Conditional 
Incentive 
Scheme 
Pre IPO 
Conditional 
Incentive 
Scheme pre 
IPO 
Conditiona
Incentive 
Scheme 
IPO 
Binary Logit 
Model 1 
Binary Logit 
Model 2 
Binary Logit 
Model 3 
Binary Logit 
Model 4 
Binary Logit 
Model 5 
Binary Logit 
Model 6 
Binary Logit 
Model 7 
Constant -1.223 -.474 -3.120 * -.829 -5.378 * -1.746 - 4.466 
Executives’ Ownership pre IPO  -.020 *** -.001  -.001 † .008 .004 
Executives Ownership at IPO    -.001    
Board Independence 1.223 .731 2.457 .563 3.250 † 3.504 † 4.783 †
Executive Compensation     .722 *  .762 †
Executives Experience      -.099 * -.113 *
Founder domination -.031 ** -.028 ** -.029 † -.019 † .026  .036 † .031 
Sales -1 ( in £000) .399 * .450 ** .164 .398 ** .341 .638 † .017 
Hi tech company .345 .307 -.649 .113 -.544 -.554 -.427 
Company Age -.024 -.001 .079 .030  .058 .073 .059 
Venture Capitalist Backed dummy .749 † .371  .407 .544 * .395 .771 .663  
% correct predictions 52.6 70.7 80.6 61.8 82.5 85.7 89.0 
Nagelkerke R2 .167 .246 .105 .128 .187 .297 .375 
Model Χ 2 value 33.19 *** 45.21 *** 6.77 23.41 *** 12.33 † 15.31 ** 19.80 **
Number of Observations 311 311 126 126 126 126 126 
≤0.10;  * p≤0.05;  ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001   
  
 1 
Table 4: Regression analysis of the effects of incentive schemes at IPO on underpricing 
Dependent variable Underpricing Underpricing Underpricing Underpricing Underpricing 
 OLS model 1 OLS model 2 
OLS model 
3 
OLS model 
4 
OLS model 
5 
Constant .091 .191 .187 .198 .313 * 
Board Independence  -.078 -.078 -.067 -.084 -.107 
Executives Retained Ownership at IPO -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 
Venture Capitalist Backed dummy .052 .052 .048 .053 .058 
Underwriter reputation  .054 .054 .052 .065 .061 
No Scheme pre IPO .100 ** -.100 **    
Pre IPO presence of incentive scheme  -.147 **    
Pre IPO presence of any conditional 
scheme   -.182 ** -.172 ** -.162 ** 
Pre IPO presence of any unconditional 
scheme   -.078 † -.073 † -.079 † 
At IPO: presence of any conditional 
scheme    -.024 † -.015 † 
Executives Experience     -.027 * 
Executive Compensation     -.009 
Sales -1 ( in £000) .018 .018 .018 .024 .003 
Hi tech company .057 .057 .056 .054 .045 
Company Age -.006 -.006 -.005 -.005 -.004 
Market Return 1.512 *** 1.512 *** 1.501 ***  1.474 *** 1.592 *** 
Market Volatility .581 -.581 .097 -.443 -.661 
Adjusted R-squared .077 .077 .079 .075 .086 
F-statistic 2.989 *** 2.989 *** 2.866 ** 2.544 ** 2.497 ** 
† p≤0.10;  * p≤0.05;  ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001  
 
 
